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執(zhí)行國際仲裁裁決 “既判爭點禁反言”（Issue Estoppel）的應(yīng)用與爭議（第一部分）

2017年第08期    作者:李靄明    閱讀 11,122 次

簡言

1.隨著中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)發(fā)展，內(nèi)地企業(yè)趨于國際化。而海外企業(yè)進(jìn)駐內(nèi)地的例子亦如恒河沙數(shù)。當(dāng)中因各種原因而產(chǎn)生的貿(mào)易糾紛變得普遍。可是，把事件訴諸法庭往往有可能對合作關(guān)系造成進(jìn)一步的影響，對企業(yè)形象難免有一定程度的損害?；谥俨玫谋Ｃ芴刭|(zhì)，其漸漸成為被企業(yè)接受的解決貿(mào)易紛爭的一個常用方法。

2.當(dāng)仲裁中的一方成功獲得裁決，接著一定是希望能盡快取得裁決所衍生的實質(zhì)成果。但由于敗方的有價值資產(chǎn)可能遍布世界各地，仲裁裁決的執(zhí)行往往變成一件不直截了當(dāng)?shù)氖虑椤?span>

3.中國是《承認(rèn)及執(zhí)行外國仲裁裁決公約》（1958年，紐約）(下稱為「《紐約公約》」) 的簽訂國。 《紐約公約》中的第五條規(guī)定，在一個成員國領(lǐng)土內(nèi)作出的仲裁裁決，另一成員國法院只能運(yùn)用酌情權(quán)以有限的理由，包括第五條所列舉的，拒絕承認(rèn)或執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決。

4.然而，隨著法理的發(fā)展，各地國家法院因各種原因而拒絕執(zhí)行仲裁裁決已變得不罕見。其中，因英國備受爭議的案例 Diag Human SE v Czech Republic [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) 于 2014 年的出現(xiàn) (案例的詳細(xì)說明請見本文的第二部份)，國際仲裁亦更關(guān)注以普通法「既判爭點禁反言」為依據(jù)抵抗裁決執(zhí)行的情況。本文旨在對此既重要且務(wù)實的問題作深入探討，并以不同普通法國家的案例為例子作進(jìn)一步說明討論。

“既判爭點禁反言”原則

5.“既判爭點禁反言”是一個已被確立及被英國法院采納已久的普通法原則。其意指如達(dá)到以下列舉的條件，與訟雙方均不能在往后任何訴訟中再爭議同一個已被早前法院審理的議題：

(1)        先前的判決必須由具有管轄權(quán)的法院提出;

(2)        先前的判決必須是最終和具決定性的 (final and conclusive) 及基于案情審訂 (on the merits) 的;

(3)        訴訟各方必須相同;

(4)        議題必須相同，即先前法院決定的問題必須與后來訴訟中需審理的問題相同。

(見 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (no 2) [1967] 1 AC 853)

“既判爭點禁反言”在仲裁裁決執(zhí)行訴訟 (Enforcement Proceedings) 中的應(yīng)用

英國

6.一般而言，英國法院認(rèn)為仲裁地法院 (Courts at the seat of arbitration) 對仲裁裁決的執(zhí)行性或有效性所作出的判決在往后的執(zhí)行訴訟中有排他性作用。如在 Gater Assets Ltd v NAK Naftogaz Ukrainiy [2008] EWHC 237 (Comm) 的第三段中法庭指出:

 

“… Mr Higham QC for the Defendant did formally keep open an argument to the effect that relief was available under section 103(2)(d) on the basis that the arbitration tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.  However this point has already twice been decided against the Defendant by the competent Russian supervisory courts.  There can be no prospect of the Defendant escaping the preclusive effect of such determinations unless it succeeds in its argument rooted in public policy and moreover in a manner relevant to the finding that the arbitration tribunal enjoyed jurisdiction.”

7.可是，英國法院會如何看待仲裁地以外法院的執(zhí)行判決于當(dāng)?shù)氐挠绊懥t還未被厘清確定。但從案例的發(fā)展可見，在關(guān)于仲裁裁決的執(zhí)行訴訟中，英國法院愿意考慮甚至接受以「既判爭點禁反言」為基礎(chǔ)提出的論據(jù)。而 Good Challenger Navegante SA v Metalexportimport SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1668 是一個較早期出現(xiàn)的關(guān)于以「既判爭點禁反言」為論點嘗試說服英國法庭接納仲裁地以外法院對仲裁裁決執(zhí)行作的判決的具代表性的案例。

8.在1983年，Good Challenger 公司在一個倫敦仲裁中獲得了針對 Metalimportexport 公司的裁決。

9.在1992年，Good Challenger 公司于羅馬尼亞尋求仲裁裁決的執(zhí)行及認(rèn)可并獲得 布加勒斯特市法院允許。 Metalimportexport 公司申請上訴，上訴庭雖維持裁決認(rèn)可的判決，但卻以裁決的執(zhí)行在英國法律下已過時限為由推翻執(zhí)行。此時限問題被爭議至羅馬尼亞最高法院。最終該最高法院于 1998 年裁定維持上訴庭判決。

10.與此同時，在 1993年，Good Challenger公司于英國尋求裁決的執(zhí)行并獲 Saville 法官批出執(zhí)行許可（leave to enforce）?？墒?，Good Challenger公司并沒有在最新的英國民事程序規(guī)則生效前把Saville法官的執(zhí)行準(zhǔn)許命令派送給Metalimportexport公司，因此該命令在當(dāng)時英國法律下被自動暫停有效 (automatically stayed)。 2001 年，英國法院解除對該命令的暫停。

11.2003 年，英國法院再次對 Good Challenger 公司獲得的仲裁裁決批出執(zhí)行許可 。本案正是處理此 2003 年判決的上訴聆訊。上訴的爭議在于羅馬尼亞最高法院指裁決的執(zhí)行在英國法律下已過時限的判決是否構(gòu)成「既判爭點禁反言」以使Good Challenger 公司不能就同一議題在英國法庭作爭議因此仲裁裁決不能在英國被執(zhí)行。

12.本案不爭議的是時限問題關(guān)系于羅馬尼亞法律第 105/1992 號第 174(a) 及 (b) 條有關(guān)執(zhí)行外國判決 (即相關(guān)的仲裁裁決) 的條文的運(yùn)用。英國上訴庭認(rèn)為就某一外國判決能否于羅馬尼亞執(zhí)行，第 174(a) 條涉及對相關(guān)英國法律的考慮 (即相關(guān)的外國法律)，而第174(b) 條則關(guān)于對羅馬尼亞當(dāng)?shù)胤傻目紤]。雖然如此，英國上訴庭認(rèn)為羅馬尼亞最高法院是不須分別就第 174(a) 及 (b) 條作出判決才能得出相關(guān)仲裁裁決能否在羅馬尼亞被執(zhí)行的結(jié)論，只要裁定第 174(a) 或 (b) 條其中一條的結(jié)論是不被執(zhí)行便已足夠達(dá)至本案的判決結(jié)果。見第六十四段之原文:

 

“…this case is somewhat different from that described by Coleridge J because, in order to conclude that the award was not enforceable in Romania, the Supreme Court did not have to decide both the issue of Romanian law under Article 174(b) and the issue of English law under Article 174(a).  A decision on either limb would have sufficed.  It would only have had to decide both points in order to hold that the award was enforceable in Romania.  That can be seen by the decisions of the Municipal Court and of the Court of Appeal, each of which decided only the Romanian law point under Article 174(b).”

 

13.本案例接納“既判爭點禁反言”原則在英國的仲裁裁決執(zhí)行訴訟中本質(zhì)上是能夠適用的。但經(jīng)仔細(xì)研究羅馬尼亞最高法院的判詞后，英國上訴庭認(rèn)為羅馬尼亞最高法院就時限問題的判決只是就羅馬尼亞第 174(b) 條關(guān)于羅馬尼亞法律的運(yùn)用作出的。就第 174(a) 條關(guān)于相關(guān)的英國法律，判詞中只有一段有限的討論，這明顯不構(gòu)成該判決的主要依據(jù)，對判決而言只屬附屬及附帶意見性質(zhì)(merely collateral or obiter) 。因此，關(guān)于第 174(a) 條的決定就整個判決來說是非必要的亦不具決定性的。因此，英國上訴庭作為仲裁地法院裁定“既判爭點禁反言”不能于此案被成立。當(dāng)中法官在判詞中有以下的說法:

 

“84. It seems to me that on a fair reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court the primary basis for its decision was the view which it formed under Article 174(b) that the claim was time barred under Romanian law.  That was sufficient to decide the case in favour of the charterers and, in particular, to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had decided the matter solely on the Romanian law point. 

85. By contrast, the judgment contains no reasons why the court rejected the owners’ submission that the six year period had been extended by the part payments and the acknowledgments.  It is of course possible that the court rejected the evidence relied upon by the owners as inadmissible but, if it did, it did not say so.  It might be said that the court rejected the part payments on the basis that the dates of the payments “were not even proved to be related to the amounts” of the award, but no such submission could be made with regard to the alleged acknowledgment in the telex of 17 March 1988, which, as stated in paragraph 18 above, would have been sufficient to extend the period to a date after 27 May 1992.  The reader of the judgment is left to speculate as to the reasons which led the court to reach the conclusion it did.

86. I agree with the judge that that is a pointer to the conclusion that this was a secondary or collateral or obiter reason for the decision.  In any event, it is far from clear whether the court was treating the Article 174(a) point as an equal ground for its decision to dismiss the appeal and, given the caution which the cases show should be used in deciding questions of this kind, for my part I would not hold that the charterers have shown that the determination of the Article 174(a) point was central to the decision and not collateral to it.

…

89. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider whether, if the other ingredients of issue estoppel were present it would be appropriate to hold that there are here special circumstances which would make it unjust to hold the owners to be issue estopped from arguing that the claim was not time barred in January 1993.  It appears to me that the lack of clarity as to the role played by the Article 174(a) point in the reasoning and decision of the Supreme Court leads to the conclusion that it would be unjust to the owners to hold that its decision gives rise to an issue estoppel.  It does not, however, do so by the application of what might be called the special circumstances exception but as a result of the conclusion that the charterers have not demonstrated that the determination of the Article 174(a) point was necessary to the decision as opposed to collateral to it.”

 

14.  從以上較早期的案例可見，在裁定「既判爭點禁反言」是否適用以接納仲裁地以外法院對仲裁裁決執(zhí)行的判決，英國法庭會對外國法院就有關(guān)執(zhí)行仲裁裁決議題上的討論作十分深入地分析。可見英國法庭對以此原則推反仲裁裁決于英國的執(zhí)行持相對審慎的態(tài)度。

 

李靄明

香港執(zhí)業(yè)大律師, 獲香港中文大學(xué)法學(xué)頒授法律學(xué)位（JD）及英國劍橋大學(xué)法學(xué)碩士。

業(yè)務(wù)方向：商業(yè)及公司法，土地法，遺產(chǎn)法及公法等，亦為國際仲裁中各方作代表律師。